During the 1990s, Intel achieved remarkable success in terms of increased sales, stock return, and market capitalization. Sales of its microprocessors went from $1.2 billion in 1989 to over $33 billion in 2000. The firm’s market capitalization grew to over $400 billion in just over three decades. Intel’s ability and willingness to reinvent its product line again and again, making obsolete business areas in which it had big investments, certainly played a key role in its success. Its operational excellence in creating complex new products with breathtaking speed and operating microprocessor fabrication plants efficiently and effectively was also critical.

Intel’s sustained rise would not have happened without the firm’s ability to create and manage a brand portfolio that included a complex set of endorser brands and subbrands. The brand story really starts in 1978 when Intel created the microprocessor chip, the 8086, which won IBM’s approval to power its first PC. The Intel chip and its subsequent generations—the 286 in 1982, the 386 in 1985, and the 486 in 1989—defined the industry standard and made Intel the dominant brand.

In early 1991, though, Intel was facing competitive pressures from competitors who were making clones of the 386 and exploiting the fact that Intel failed to obtain trademark protection on the X86 series. Calling their products names like the AMD386, these firms created confusion by implying that an AMD386 was as effective as any other 386.

To respond to this business challenge, in the spring of 1991 Intel began a remarkable ingredient branding program, establishing the “Intel Inside” brand with an initial budget of around $100 million. (The logo—which has a light, personal touch, as if it was written on an informal note—was a sharp departure from Intel’s corporate “dropped-e” logo.) Under the branding program, computer manufacturers who properly displayed the Intel Inside logo received a 6% allowance on their purchases of Intel microprocessors, which could be used to pay for up to 50% of the partner’s advertising . Partners also were required to create subbrands for products using a competing microprocessor, so that buyers would realize that they were buying a computer without Intel Inside.

This decision was very controversial within Intel. Many people argued that brand building was irrelevant for a firm that only sold to a handful of computer manufacturers; the money could be used for R&D instead. Within a relatively short time, however, the Intel Inside logo became ubiquitous, and the program was an incredible success. Even as the budget grew to well over $1 billion per year, the brand-building effort was perceived to generate such loyalty that it more than paid for itself.

For many years, a computer with an Intel Inside logo could be sold at around a 10% premium (for the whole computer, not just the Intel microprocessor). Because of the logo’s wide exposure, Intel was given credit for creating reliable and innovative products and for being an organization of substance and leadership—even though most computer buyers had no idea what a microprocessor was, or why Intel’s were better.

In the fall of 1992, though, when Intel was ready to announce the successor to the 486 chip, it faced increasing competitor confusion despite the Intel Inside campaign. A huge decision loomed. Calling the successor the Intel 586 would leverage the Intel Inside brand and provide familiarity to customers who had become accustomed to the X86 progression. Even so, Intel elected to give the chip a new name: Pentium.

Four key issues guided the decision to adapt the Pentium brand. First, it would avoid confusion with competitors who might also use the 586 name. Second, the cost of creating a new brand and transitioning customers to it, although huge, was within the capacity and will of Intel. Third, the Intel Inside equity and program could be leveraged by adding “Intel Inside” on the new Pentium logo, in essence making the former brand an endorser for the latter. Finally, a new name would signal that the product was a significant enough advance to support demand at a premium price, which was necessary to pay for a costly new fabrication plant.

A few years later, Intel developed an improved Pentium with superior graphic capability. Rather than change the brand name itself, the firm added a branded technology, MMX, to the Pentium. This decision gave the Pentium brand more time to repay its investment, and it reserved the impact of announcing a new-generation chip for a more substantial technological leap. Subsequent generations did emerge and leveraged the Pentium name and equity with names like Pentium Pro (1995), Pentium II (1997), Pentium III (1999), and Pentium 4 (2000).

In 1998 Intel decided to extend its reach to mid-range and higher-end servers and workstations. To address this market, it developed features that allowed four or eight processors to be linked to supply the necessary computing power. This progress, however, raised a branding issue. On one hand, because the Pentium brand was associated with the lower-end personal computer market, it would not be regarded as suitable for servers and workstations. On the other hand, the market would not support developing yet another stand-alone brand alongside Intel Inside and Pentium. The solution was to introduce a subbrand, the Pentium II Xeon, in 1998. The subbrand distanced the new microprocessor enough from Pentium to make it palatable for the higher-end users. It also had the secondary advantage of enhancing the Pentium brand because it associated Pentium with a more advanced product.

In 2001, the Xeon subbrand stepped out from behind the Pentium name. Technological advances (in particular, the branded NetBurst architecture) had dramatically improved the chip’s processing power. The Xeon brand had also become established, making it easier to support as a stand-alone brand, and initial trademark issues over the Xeon name had been resolved. Finally, because the target market had become even more important to Intel, having a brand devoted to it was now a strategic imperative.

In 1999 another problem or opportunity emerged. As the PC market matured, a value segment emerged, led by some competitors eager to find a niche and willing to undercut the Intel price points. Intel needed to compete in this market, if only defensively, but using the Pentium brand (even with a subbrand) would have been extremely risky. The solution was a stand-alone brand, Celeron. The brand-building budget, like that for many value brands, was minimal—the target market found the brand, rather than the other way around.

The decision was made to link the Celeron to Intel Inside, so there was an indirect link to Pentium. The trade-off was the credibility that the Intel endorsement would provide to Celeron versus the need to protect the Pentium brand from cannibalization and a tarnished image through association with a lower-end entry.

In 2001, Intel introduced the Itanium processor as a new-generation successor to the Pentium series. Why not call it the Pentium 5? The processor was built from the ground up with an entirely new architecture, based on a branded design termed Explicitly Parallel Instruction Computing (EPIC), and it had 64-bit computing power as opposed to the 32-bit Pentiums. Capable of delivering a new level of performance for high-end enterprise-class servers, the processor needed a new name to signal that it was qualitatively different than the Pentium.

In 2003, Intel introduced its Centrino mobile technology. The new processor provided laptop computers with enhanced performance, extended battery life, integrated wireless connectivity, and thinner, lighter designs. These groundbreaking advances promised to fundamentally affect personal lifestyles and business productivity by enabling people to “unconnect” (the Centrino advertising tag line is “Unwire Your Life”). The new Centrino logo reflects the Intel vision of the convergence of communication and computing, as well as a new approach to product development. Rather than simply pushing the performance envelope, this product responded to real customer needs as determined by market research.

The most dramatic element of the Centrino logo is its shape, a sharp departure from the rectangular design family that preceded it. The two wings suggest a merger of technology and lifestyle, a forward-looking perspective, and the freedom to go where you will. The magenta color used for the Centrino wing balances the Intel blue and visually connotes youth and excitement while suggesting a connection between technology and passion, logic and emotions. The Intel Inside logo has also evolved. More precise, sophisticated, and confident, it now provides a link to the classic dropped-e Intel corporate logo and reflects a world in which the positives of the corporate connection and the loyalty program can be linked.

For Discussion

1. The Intel Inside campaign started in the spring of 1991 and $100 million was budgeted for it in 1992. Was that worthwhile? Why would Compaq participate in the program? What about Dell? How would you evaluate the program? What alternatives does a competitor such as AMD have to combat the Intel Inside branding strategy?

2. In the fall of 1992, when the “586” chip was ready, would you have called it Intel 586 or i586, or would you have started over with a new name? What are the pros and cons of each alternative?

3. What effects did changing the brand name from X86 to Pentium and others have on Intel’s ability to manage the product life cycle of the newly branded products?

4. When would a new product require a new name (such as Pentium) versus a new subbrand (such as Xeon)?

5. Evaluate the Centrino brand strategy. Will it help Intel be relevant to the mobile computing world?

I need this done by 9 am Sunday 5 May EST please 🙂 ( I had to have it at 12 hrs so that I could invite you directly )

COUN – 6722 Counseling and Psychotherapy Theories

Final exam WEEK 10

ONLY EXCEPT IF YOU ARE POSITIVE THAT YOU CAN HELP WITH THESE QUESTIONS100% CORRECTLY 🙂

COUN-6722-31,Theories of Counseling.

COUN – 6722 Counseling and Psychotherapy Theories

Hi need help with my exam. 50 questions listed w/in the doc

I have the link for the text book if required but a lot of info is on Course Hero and quizlet

can you help in communication assignments , its communication humanities class

Read the articles posted in Chapter 15 Module folder “Why You Need a Well-Crafted Social Media Strategy Right Now;” “How to Compete with Social Network Influencer Platforms;” and the linked article “The Difference Between Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, Google+, YouTube, & Pinterest“

I need Reply to TWO (2) classmates and comment on their recommendations and provide further suggestions.

Student 1

I work at House of Schwan and their job is to supply grocery and liquor stores of Wichita with alcoholic beverages. Many people enjoy a nice cold drink with their friends. This market is for everyone above the age of 21. It targets college students, working males and females who love the taste of beer. As well as people who just want to get drunk. The beer industry is huge world wide, in the U.S. and in Wichita as well. I really don’t drink beer but I was not aware that grocery stores were now able to sell “real” beer, meaning that the product has more percentage of alcohol in it and not as watered down as previous years. This should have been heavily advertised from grocery stores in the social media world. Many people would have been informed and would most likely make them shop at grocery stores for beer because it is cheaper than going to a liquor store. Social media is huge in today’s age and many young people love to use it. There are many connections that help spread the word either for a cause, to make a statement, or plain advertisement. Social media connects us together and it is fun and easy to use. Anyone can get online and begin meeting the virtual world.

Student 2

I work at an insurance brokerage, where they have many different social media platforms such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Instagram.
There is one person who has the responsibility of updating all the social media accounts.
They post things that relate to peoples’ insurance like post from Nationwide or EMC.

I think how they could differentiate their approach is to advertise and let clients know about the social media pages that way the clients can see informational posts about their insurance.
They could also utilize these social media platforms by making advertisements that go on Facebook so when the clients are scrolling through or even future prospects they can see information about the company and to visit the website from the advertisement.
They could utilize LinkedIn by adding job descriptions on there for positions they are needing to fill.
Instagram would be a good social media platform to utilize when they have pictures they want to share with clients.

Article 1:

Acts of cyberterrorism differ from acts of hacktivism in that their intentions or consequences involve more severe, permanent damage. This can include loss of life or economic collateral. Most of our sources suggest that cyberterrorism is not justifiable by freedom of speech.

Barry C. Collin of the Institute for Security and Intelligence describes the following hypothetical acts of cyberterrorism. While unlikely, each example illustrates the ways in which cyberterrorism goes beyond the boundaries of hacktivism.

“A CyberTerrorist will remotely access the processing control systems of a cereal manufacturer. change the levels of iron supplement, and sicken and kill the children of a nation enjoying their food.”

“A CyberTerrorist will attack the next generation of air traffic control systems, and collide two large civilian aircraft. …Much of the same can be done to the rail lines.

“A CyberTerrorist will remotely alter the formulas of medication at pharmaceutical manufacturers.”

Mark Pollitt argues that cyberterrorist acts such as the ones above would be highly improbable because of the level of human involvement in each example: “Computers do not, at present, control sufficient physical processes, without human intervention, to pose a significant risk of terrorism in the classic sense.” In the case of the cereal factory, for instance, Pollitt points out that the rapid depletion of the factory’s iron supplies, as well as the change in taste of the cereal, would be immediately noticeable to the people working there.

Nonetheless, some acts of cyberterrorism are successful, as is demonstrated by the examples of Anonymous and Stuxnet. Cyberterrorists indeed pose a threat to national security. It is therefore important for software systems performing critical tasks or guarding critical data to be thoroughly tested and made as close to impenetrable as possible.

Article- 2:

Ransomware apocalypse, brought to you by the NSA

In May 2017, a global cyberattack called WannaCry infected more than 230,000 computers across 150 countries. The ransomware locked down all the files on an infected computer, at which point the hackers demanded $300 in Bitcoin payments to release control of the files. This hard-drive encrypting malware spread rapidly because the group behind this had combined normal malware with EternalBlue, a leaked NSA hacking tool which allowed WannaCry to use worm like capabilities to self-propagate on vulnerable windows systems. Initially, there were speculations that WannaCry was spread using an email spam campaign but, later it was deduced that this attack did not require user interaction at all.

The ransom note told victims their files were encrypted and their documents, photos, videos and databases were ‘no longer accessible’ and that nobody can recover your files without our decryption service’.

Using EternalBlue and another leaked exploit in the form of DoublePulsar, the worm looked for vulnerable public-facing SMB ports so that it can establish a connection to. Once these were located, the leaked SMB (server message block) exploits were harnessed to not only deploy WannaCry on that particular system, but to spread to all other vulnerable machines on the connected network. Nefarious packets were sent to vulnerable machines in an undetected form which was a serious limitation in the older versions of Microsoft XP, 8 and 2003 operating systems. In essence, even just one open, vulnerable SMB port could lead to a whole network being infected by the ransomware.

Among the victims: FedEx, the French carmaker Renault, the Russian Interior Ministry and the most impacted agency was Britain’s National Health Service where the effect on the health service was particularly devastating: ambulances were diverted, patient records were inaccessible, surgical procedures were canceled, telephone calls could not be received. In Romania, the carmaker Dacia, owned by the French carmaker Renault, had sent home some employees at a large factory complex in the city of Mioveni because the attack had disrupted its systems. Bayer, the manufacturer of the health instruments, said it received reports of infections on two of its radiology machines at different facilities. Nissan, the Japanese auto giant, said its manufacturing center in Sunderland in the north of England had been affected. But of all, National Health Service may be one of the largest institutions affected worldwide. It said that 45 of its hospitals, doctors’ offices and ambulance companies had been crippled. Surgical procedures were canceled and some hospital operations shut down as government officials struggled to respond to the attack.

In the midst of all of this, Marcus Hutchins, then a 22-year-old British security researcher, stumbled upon a “kill switch” in the WannaCry code and slammed the brakes on a global crisis.

This high profile incident could have been easily avoided if huge organizations kept their security systems and firewalls updated. Microsoft had released a security patch against EternalBlue two months before the attack but most organizations hadn’t applied it which shows the abysmal situation of huge corporations when it comes to security patching.